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Abstract
Although distributed key generation (DKG) has been
studied for some time, it has never been examined outside
of the synchronous setting. We present the ﬁrst realistic
DKG architecture for use over the Internet. We propose
a practical system model and deﬁne an efﬁcient veriﬁable
secret sharing scheme in it. We observe the necessity of
Byzantine agreement for asynchronous DKG and analyze the
difﬁculty of using a randomized protocol for it. Using our
veriﬁable secret sharing scheme and a leader-based agree-
ment protocol, we then design a DKG protocol for public-
key cryptography. Finally, along with traditional proactive
security, we also introduce group modiﬁcation primitives in
our system.
1. Introduction
A distributed key generation (DKG) protocol is a funda-
mental building block of both symmetric and asymmetric
threshold cryptography. In essence, an (n,t)-DKG protocol
[1] allows a set of n nodes to collectively generate a secret
with its shares spread over the nodes such that any subset of
size greater than a threshold t can reveal or use the shared
secret, while smaller subsets do not have any knowledge
about it. Unlike secret sharing [2], [3], where a dealer
generates a secret and distributes its shares among the nodes,
DKG requires no trusted party.
In symmetric-key cryptography, DKGs are used to de-
sign distributed key distribution centres [4]. In public-
key cryptography (PKC), they are essential for dealerless
threshold public-key encryption and signature schemes [5]
and for truly distributed private-key generation in identity-
based cryptography (IBC) [6]. In threshold encryption and
signature schemes, DKG tackles the problem of single point
of failure. In IBC, it also mitigates the key escrow issue
and becomes important when IBC is used in practical sys-
tems, outside the usual organizational settings. It is also an
important primitive in distributed pseudo-random functions
[4], which are useful in designing distributed coin tossing
algorithms [7] and random oracles [8].
As a whole, numerous applications based on DKG have
been proposed (see [9] and references therein). However,
most of them assume a synchronous communication model
or a broadcast channel. The systems issues to be considered
while realizing DKGs over the Internet have largely been
ignored and there is no implementation available yet. This
need for a practical DKG forms the motivation of this work.
Veriﬁable Secret Sharing—VSS. In secret sharing, clients
need to verify a consistent dealing (integrity) to prevent
malicious behaviour by the dealer. A scheme with such a ver-
iﬁability property is known as veriﬁable secret sharing[10].
Feldman [11] developed the ﬁrst efﬁcient and non-interactive
VSS protocol. He used a commitment with computational
security and unconditional share integrity to achieve it. Ped-
ersen presented another commitment [1] with unconditional
security but computational integrity. In computational PKC,
with adversarial access to the public key, unconditional
security for the secret is impossible. Consequently, with
simplicity and efﬁciency, Feldman’s commitments form the
basis for many VSSs, including ours.
Proactive VSS. The most common attacks on security
mechanisms are system attacks, where the system’s crypto-
graphic keys are directly exposed, rather than cryptanalytic
attacks. Due to the endless supply of security ﬂaws in almost
all existing software, these system attacks are often easy
to implement. Threshold cryptography enhances security
against system break-ins, but its effect is limited. Given
sufﬁcient time, a mobile attacker can break into system
nodes one by one (gradual break-in) and eventually compro-
mise the security of the whole system [12]. Proactive secret
sharing [13], which combines distributed trust with periodic
share renewal, protects a system against these gradual break-
ins. Here, the system’s time is divided into phases. At the
start of each phase, nodes’ secret shares are renewed such
that new shares are independent of previous ones, except for
the fact that they interpolate to the same secret key. With an
assumption that the adversary may corrupt at most t nodes
in each phase, the system now becomes secure.
Asynchronous VSS. Although the literature for VSS
has been vast, asynchronous VSS has not yet received the
required attention. Canetti and Rabin [14] developed the
ﬁrst complete VSS scheme with unconditional security in
the asynchronous communication model having no bounds
on message transfer delays or processor speeds. However,
this scheme and its successors [15], [16], due to their
Ω(n5) communication complexities (bit length of messagestransferred), are prohibitively expensive for any realistic
use. Compromising the unconditional security assumption,
Cachin et al. (AVSS) [17], Zhou et al. (APSS) [18], and
more recently Schultz et al. (MPSS) [19] suggested more
practical asynchronous VSS schemes. APSS severely re-
stricts t with its Ω
￿￿n
t
￿￿
message complexity (number of
messages transferred), and is thus very ineffective in general.
A bivariate polynomial based AVSS and a univariate polyno-
mial based MPSS have the same reasonable communication
complexity of O(n3). However, security is preserved in
MPSS only when sets of nodes used in two consecutive
phases are disjoint; this is not ideal in many scenarios. On
other hand, AVSS assimilates a bivariate polynomial into
Bracha’s reliable broadcast [20] and can provide complete
ﬂexibility with the sets used without hampering the security.
In an asynchronous VSS protocol with reliability guarantees,
any two nodes need to verify the dealer’s commitment of
size Ω(n) with each other to achieve consistency; thus, a
protocol with o(n3) communication complexity does not
seem to be possible and AVSS, with optimal communication
complexity, forms the basis for our VSS.
Contributions. In this paper, we design the ﬁrst practical
DKG protocol for use over the Internet.
• As our ﬁrst contribution, we deﬁne a realistic system
model over the Internet (§2). We combine the standard
Byzantine adversary with crash-recovery and network
failures in an asynchronous setting. We analyze the
asynchronous versus partially synchronous dichotomy
for the Internet and justify the choice of treating crashes
and network failures separately.
• We present a VSS scheme (HybridVSS) that works in
our system model (§3), investigate the necessity of an
agreement scheme for asynchronous DKG, and deﬁne
a practical DKG protocol (§4). We use a leader-based
agreement scheme in our DKG, as we observe a few
pragmatic and efﬁciency related issues with the usually
suggested randomized agreement schemes.
• Along with proactive security (§5), observing the im-
portance of group modiﬁcations for a long-term system
sustainability, we also devise protocols for group mod-
iﬁcation agreement, node addition, node removal and
threshold and crash-limit modiﬁcation (§6).
• Finally, we touch upon the system design and discuss
the system’s resilience against denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks and Sybil attacks (§7).
2. Assumptions and System Model
2.1. Communication Model
Our DKG protocol should be deployable over the Internet.
The expected message-transfer delay and the expected clock
offset there (a few seconds, in general) is signiﬁcantly
smaller than the required timespan of a system phase (a
few days). With such an enormous difference, a failure of
the network to deliver a message within a ﬁxed time bound
can be treated as a failure of the sender; this may lead to
a retransmission of the message after appropriate timeout
signals. As this is possible without any signiﬁcant loss in the
synchrony of the system, the asynchronous communication
assumption seems to be unnecessarily pessimistic here. It
is tempting to treat the Internet as a partially synchronous
network (bounded message delivery delays and processor
speeds, but the bounds are unknown and eventual [21]) and
develop more efﬁcient protocols using well-known message
delivery time bounds and system run-time assumptions.
However, deciding these time bounds correctly is a difﬁ-
cult problem to solve. Further, even if it is possible to de-
termine tight bounds between the optimistic and pessimistic
cases, there is a considerable difference between the selected
time bounds and the usual computation and communication
time. Protocols explicitly based on synchronous or partially
synchronous assumptions invariably use these time bounds
in their deﬁnitions, while those based on the asynchronous
assumption solely use numbers and types of messages. A
real-world adversary, with knowledge of any time bounds
used, can always slow down the protocols by delaying its
messages to the verge of the time bounds. In asynchronous
protocols, although it is assumed that the adversary manages
the communication channels and can delay messages as it
wishes, a real-world adversary cannot control communica-
tion channels for all the honest nodes. It is practical to
assume that network links between most of the honest nodes
are perfect. Consequently, even if the adversary delays its
messages, an asynchronous protocol completes without any
delay with honest nodes communicating promptly. Thus, the
asynchrony assumption may increase message complexity
or the latency degree (number of communication rounds),
but in practice does not increase the actual execution time.
Observing this, we use the asynchronous communication
assumption for our protocols.
Weak Synchrony (only for liveness). For liveness (the
protocol eventually terminates), but not safety (the protocol
does not fail or produce incorrect results), we need a weak
synchrony assumption. Otherwise, we could implement con-
sensus in an asynchronous system, which is impossible [22].
We use a weak synchrony assumption by Castro and Liskov
[23] to achieve liveness. Let delay(t) be the time between
the moment t when a message is sent for the ﬁrst time
and the moment when it is received by its destination. The
sender keeps retransmitting the message until it is received
correctly. We assume that delay(t) does not grow faster than
t indeﬁnitely. Assuming that network faults are eventually
repaired and DoS attacks eventually stop, this assumption
seems to be valid in practice. It is also strictly weaker than
the partially synchronous communication assumption.2.2. Byzantine Adversary, Crash-Recoveries and
Link Failures
Most of the distributed computing protocols in the lit-
erature assume a t-limited Byzantine adversary, who com-
promises up to t out of n system nodes and makes them
behave arbitrarily. We aim at proactive security for our
protocols, where the t-limited mobile Byzantine adversary
can change its choice of t nodes as time progresses. Here,
a node compromised during a phase remains unused, after
recovery, for the remainder of that phase as its share is
already compromised. Any intra-phase share modiﬁcation
for a recovered node leads to intra-phase share modiﬁcation
to all the nodes, which is unacceptable in general.
This does not model failures over the Internet in the best
way. Other than malicious attacks leading to compromise,
some nodes (say f of them) may just crash silently without
showing arbitrary behaviours or get disconnected from the
rest of the network due to network failures or partitioning.
Importantly, secrets at these f nodes is not available to the
adversary and modelling them as Byzantine failures not only
leads to sub-optimal resilience of n ≥ 3(t + f) + 1 instead
of n ≥ 3t+2f +1, but it also increases the communication
complexity with added security requirements (t + f instead
of t). Keeping such nodes inactive, after their recovery, until
the start of next phase is not ideal. This prompts us to use
a hybrid model.
Our system adopts the hybrid model by Backes and
Cachin [24], but with a modiﬁcation to accommodate broken
links. From any honest node’s perspective, a crashed node
behaves similarly to a node whose link with it is broken
and we model link failures in the form of crashes. For every
broken link between two nodes, we assume that at least
one of two nodes is among the list of currently crashed
nodes.1 Further, all non-Byzantine nodes may crash and
recover repeatedly with a maximum f crashed nodes at
any instant and a recovering honest node recovers from a
well-deﬁned state using, for example, a read-only memory.
We also assume that the adversary delivers all the messages
between two uncrashed nodes. We drop the requirement of
proactive security at this point and pick it back up in §5.
Formally, we consider an asynchronous network of n ≥
3t + 2f + 1 nodes P1,...,Pn of which the adversary may
corrupt up to t nodes during its existence and may crash
another f nodes at any time. For f = 0, 3t + 1 nodes are
required as a differentiation between slow honest nodes and
Byzantine nodes is not possible in an asynchronous network,
while for t = 0, 2f + 1 nodes are mandatory to achieve
consistency. At least n − t − f nodes, which are not in the
crashed state at the end of a protocol, are termed ﬁnally up
nodes.
1. A node that is crashed means that some of its links are down, not
necessarily that they all are.
2.3. Complexity and Cryptographic Assumptions
Our adversary is computationally bounded with a security
parameter κ. A function ǫ( ) is called negligible if for all
c > 0 there exists a κ0 such that ǫ(k) < 1/κc for all κ > κ0.
An unbounded number of crashes can cause the protocol
execution time to be unbounded. We restrict the adversary
by function d(κ) that represents the maximum number of
crashes that the adversary is allowed to perform during
its lifetime. As we consider a computationally bounded
adversary, we aim at bounding protocol complexities by
a polynomial in the adversary’s running time. Similar to
Backes and Cachin, we expect that the communication
complexities of our protocols are bounded by the notion of
d-uniformly bounded statistics. [24, Def. 1]
The infeasibility of the adversary to compute discrete log-
arithms modulo large primes forms our main cryptographic
assumption. We consider a prime p such that there exists
a κ-bit prime q and q|(p − 1). Let G be a multiplicative
subgroup of Z∗
p of order q and let g ∈ G be a generator.
For every probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A and
x ∈ [1,q], probability Pr(A(p,q,g,gx) = x) is negligible.
The adversary is also static and rushing. It has to choose
its t compromisable nodes before a protocol run.2 However,
it can wait for the messages of the uncorrupted players to
be transmitted, then decide on its computation and commu-
nication for that round, and still get its messages delivered
to the honest parties on time.
We use a PKI infrastructure in the form of a PKI hierarchy
with an external certifying authority (CA) to achieve authen-
ticated and conﬁdential communication with TLS links, and
message authentication with any digital signature scheme
secure against adaptive chosen-message attack . Each node
also has a unique identifying index. We assume that indices
and public keys for all nodes are publicly available in the
form of certiﬁcates. It is possible to achieve similar security
guarantees in a symmetric-key setting with long-term keys.
3. VSS for the Hybrid Model—HybridVSS
VSS is the most important part of any distributed key
generation environment. Our VSS protocol modiﬁes the
AVSS protocol [17] for our hybrid model. We include
recovery messages similar to those from the reliable broad-
cast protocol by Backes and Cachin [24]. We achieve a
constant-factor reduction in the protocol complexities using
symmetric bivariate polynomials. Further, as described in §1,
we use the simpler commitment scheme by Feldman [11]
rather than Pedersen’s commitment scheme [1].
2. As we use Feldman’s VSS, we do not prove security against an
adaptive adversary. However, as claimed by Feldman [11, Sec. 9.3],
although the use of simulation-based security proof did not work out for an
adaptive adversary, the VSS scheme does seem secure against an adaptive
attack. This is further supported by the fact that there has been no known
adaptive attack for the last twenty years.Protocol Description. Our VSS protocol is composed
of a sharing protocol (Sh) and a reconstruction protocol
(Rec). In protocol Sh, a dealer Pd upon receiving a
(Pd,τ,in,share,s) message, shares a secret s, where a
counter τ and the dealer identity Pd forms a unique session
identiﬁer. Node Pi ﬁnishes the Sh protocol by outputting
a (Pd,τ,out,shared,C,si) message, where C is the com-
mitment and si is its secret share. Any time after that, upon
receiving a message (Pd,τ,in,reconstruct), Pi starts the
Rec protocol. The Rec protocol terminates for a node Pi
when Pi outputs a message (Pd,τ,out,reconstructed,zi),
where zi is Pi’s reconstructed value of the secret s.
Deﬁnition 3.1: In session (Pd,τ), protocol VSS in our
hybrid model (HybridVSS) having an asynchronous net-
work of n ≥ 3t + 2f + 1 nodes with a t-limited Byzantine
adversary and f-limited crashes and network failures satis-
ﬁes following conditions:
Liveness: If the dealer Pd is honest and ﬁnally up in the
sharing stage of session (Pd,τ), then all honest ﬁnally
up nodes complete protocol Sh.
Agreement: If some honest node completes protocol Sh of
session (Pd,τ), then all honest ﬁnally up nodes will
eventually complete protocol Sh in session (Pd,τ). If
all honest ﬁnally up nodes subsequently start protocol
Rec for session (Pd,τ), then all honest ﬁnally up nodes
will ﬁnish protocol Rec in session (Pd,τ).
Consistency: Once t + 1 honest nodes complete protocol
Sh for session (Pd,τ), then there exists a ﬁxed value
z such that
• if the dealer is honest and has shared secret s in
session (Pd,τ), then z = s, and
• if an honest node Pi reconstructs zi in session
(Pd,τ), then zi = z.
Privacy: If an honest dealer has shared secret s in ses-
sion (Pd,τ) and no honest node has started the Rec
protocol, then, except with negligible probability, the
adversary cannot compute the shared secret s.
Efﬁciency: The communication complexity for any instance
of HybridVSS is d-uniformly bounded.
We assume that messages from all the honest and uncrashed
nodes are delivered by the adversary.
Figure 1 describes the Sh protocol for HybridVSS. The
Rec protocol is same as reconstruction stage of AVSS and
we refer readers to [25] for its description. We use pseudo-
code notation and include a special condition upon to deﬁne
actions based on messages received from other nodes or
system events. C is a matrix of commitment entries and eC
and rC are Pi’s associated counters for echo and ready
messages, respectively. In order to facilitate recovery of the
crashed nodes, each node Pi stores all outgoing messages
along with their intended recipients in a set B. Bℓ indicates
the subset of B intended for the node Pℓ. Counters c and cℓ
keep track of the numbers of overall help requests and help
Sh protocol for node Pi and session (Pd,τ)
upon initialization:
for all C do
AC ← ∅; eC ← 0; rC ← 0
c ← 0; cℓ ← 0 for all ℓ ∈ [1,n]
upon a message (Pd,τ,in,share,s): /* only Pd */
choose a random symmetric bivariate polynomial
f(x,y) =
Pt
j,ℓ=0 fjℓx
jy
ℓ ∈ Zq[x,y]
such that f00 = s and fjℓ = fℓj for j,ℓ ∈ [0,t]
C ← Cjℓ where Cjℓ = g
fjℓ for j,ℓ ∈ [0,t]
for all j ∈ [1,n] do
aj(y) ← f(j,y)
send the message (Pd,τ,send,C,aj) to Pj
upon a message (Pd,τ,send,C,a) from Pd (ﬁrst time):
if verify-poly(C,i,a) then
for all j ∈ [1,n] do
send the message (Pd,τ,echo,C,a(j)) to Pj
upon a message (Pd,τ,echo,C,α) from Pm (ﬁrst time):
if verify-point(C,i,m,α) then
AC ← AC ∪ {(m,α)}; eC ← eC + 1
if eC = ⌈
n+t+1
2 ⌉ and rC < t + 1 then
Lagrange-interpolate a from AC
for all j ∈ [1,n] do
send the message (Pd,τ,ready,C,a(j)) to Pj
upon a message (Pd,τ,ready,C,α) from Pm (ﬁrst time):
if verify-point(C,i,m,α) then
AC ← AC ∪ {(m,α)}; rC ← rC + 1
if rC = t + 1 and eC < ⌈
n+t+1
2 ⌉ then
Lagrange-interpolate a from AC
for all j ∈ [1,n] do
send the message (Pd,τ,ready,C,a(j)) to Pj
else if rC = n − t − f then
si ← a(0)
output (Pd,τ,out,shared,C,si)
upon (Pd,τ,in,recover):
send the message (Pd,τ,help) to all the nodes
send all messages in B
upon a message (Pd,τ,help) from Pℓ:
if cℓ ≤ d(κ) and c ≤ (t + 1)d(κ) then
cℓ ← cℓ + 1; c ← c + 1
send all messages of Bℓ
Figure 1. Protocol HybridVSS (Sharing step)
requests sent by each node Pℓ respectively. We also use the
following predicates in our protocol.
verify-poly(C,i,a) veriﬁes that the given polynomial a of
Pi is consistent with the commitment C. Here, a(y) = Pt
ℓ=0 aℓyℓ is a degree t polynomial. The predicate is
true if and only if gaℓ =
Qt
j=0(Cjℓ)i
j
for all ℓ ∈ [0,t].
verify-point(C,i,m,α) veriﬁes that the given value α
corresponds to the polynomial evaluation f(m,i). It is
true if and only if gα =
Qt
j,ℓ=0 (Cjℓ)m
ji
ℓ
.Analysis. The main theorem for HybridVSS is as follows.
Theorem 3.1: Assuming the hardness of the discrete-
logarithm problem, protocol HybridVSS implements asyn-
chronous veriﬁable secret sharing in the hybrid model for
n ≥ 3t + 2f + 1.
We need to show liveness, agreement, consistency, privacy,
and efﬁciency. We combine proof strategies from AVSS [17,
Sec. 3.3] and reliable broadcast [24, Sec. 3.3] to achieve this.
We next brieﬂy discuss efﬁciency and refer readers to [25]
for a detailed proof.
Efﬁciency Discussion: A protocol execution without any
crashes has O(n2) message complexity and O(κn4) com-
munication complexity where the size of the message is
dominated by the matrix C having O(n2) entries. Using
a collision-resistant hash function, Cachin et al. [17, Sec.
3.4] suggest a way to reduce the communication complexity
to O(κn3), which remains applicable in our HybridVSS. In
the case of crashes, the recovery mechanism requires O(n2)
messages from the recovering node and O(n) messages
from each helper node. With the number of possible crashes
bounded by d(κ), the number of recoveries is bounded
by (t + 1)d(κ) and the total message and communication
complexity of HybridVSS are O(tdn2) and O(κtdn3) re-
spectively; we thus obtain a uniform polynomial bound on
the communication complexity.
4. Distributed Key Generation—DKG
HybridVSS requires a dealer (Pd) to select a secret and
to initiate a sharing. DKG, going one step further, generates
a secret in a completely distributed fashion, such that none
of the system nodes knows the secret, while any t+1 nodes
can combine their shares to determine it. Although it seems
that a DKG is just a system with n nodes running their VSSs
in parallel and summing all the received shares together at
the end, it is not that simple in an asynchronous setting.
Agreeing on t + 1 or more VSS instances such that all
of them will ﬁnish for all the honest nodes (the agreement
on a set problem [26]), and the difﬁculty of differentiating
between a slow node and a faulty node in the asynchronous
setting are the primary sources of the added complexity.
In our hybrid system model, with no timing assumption,
the node cannot wait for more than n − t − f VSSs
to ﬁnish. The adversary can certainly make agreeing on
a subset of size t + 1 among those nodes impossible,
by appropriately delaying its messages. Cachin et al. [17]
solves a similar agreement problem in their proactive refresh
protocol using a multi-valued validated Byzantine agreement
(MVBA) protocol. Known MVBA protocols [27] require
threshold signature and threshold coin-tossing primitives [7]
and the suggested algorithms for both of these primitives
require either a dealer or a DKG. As we aim to avoid
the former in this paper and the latter is our aim itself,
we cannot use their MVBA protocol. Randomization in the
form of distributed coin tossing or equivalent randomization
functionality is necessary for an expected constant-round
Byzantine agreement; it thwarts the attack possible with
an adversary knowing the pre-deﬁned node selection order.
However, an efﬁcient algorithm for dealerless distributed
coin tossing without a DKG is difﬁcult to achieve3, and
we refrain from using randomized Byzantine agreement
protocols.
We follow a much simpler approach with the same
communication complexity as MVBA protocols. We use a
leader-initiated reliable broadcast system with a faulty-leader
change facility, inspired by Castro and Liskov’s view-change
protocol [23]. We choose this (optimistic phase + pessimistic
phase) approach, as we expect the Byzantine failures to be
infrequent in practice. The probability that the current leader
of the system is not behaving correctly is small and it is not
worth spending more time and bandwidth by broadcasting
proposals by all the nodes during every MVBA. With this
background, we now deﬁne and analyze our DKG protocol.
Protocol Description. In our DKG protocol, for session τ
and leader L, each node Pd selects a secret value sd and
shares it among the group using protocol Sh of HybridVSS
for session (Pd,τ). Each node ﬁnishes the DKG protocol by
outputting a (L,τ,DKG-completed,C,si) message, where
si and C are its share and the commitment respectively and
L = L or a subsequent leader
Deﬁnition 4.1: In session τ, protocol DKG in our hybrid
model having an asynchronous network of n ≥ 3t+2f +1
nodes with a t-limited Byzantine adversary and f-limited
crashes and network failures satisﬁes the following condi-
tions:
Liveness: All honest ﬁnally up nodes complete protocol
DKG in session τ, except with negligible probability.
Agreement: If some honest node completes protocol DKG
in session τ, then, except with negligible probability,
all honest ﬁnally up nodes will eventually complete
protocol DKG in session τ.
Consistency: Once an honest node completes the DKG
protocol for session τ, then there exists a ﬁxed value s
such that, if an honest node Pi reconstructs zi in session
τ, then zi = s.
Privacy: If no honest node has started the Rec protocol,
then, except with negligible probability, the adversary
cannot compute the shared secret s.
Efﬁciency: The communication complexity for any instance
of DKG is d-uniformly bounded.
We assume that messages from all the honest and uncrashed
nodes are delivered by the adversary.
We ﬁrst describe the optimistic phase of our DKG pro-
tocol. For each session τ, one among n nodes works as
3. Canetti and Rabin [14] deﬁne a dealerless distributed coin tossing
without a DKG; however, their protocol requires n2 VSSs for each coin
toss and is consequently inefﬁcient.Optimistic phase for node Pi in session (τ) with Leader L
upon initialization:
eQ ← 0; rQ ← 0 for every Q
Q ← ∅; b Q ← ∅
M ← b R ← n − t − f signed lead-ch messages for L
c ← 0; cℓ ← 0 for all ℓ ∈ [1,n]
lcL ← 0 for each L; lcflag ← false; L++ ← π
−1(L)
for all d ∈ [1,n] do
initialize extended-HybridVSS Sh protocol (Pd,τ)
upon (Pd,τ,out,shared,Cd,si,d,Rd) (ﬁrst time):
b Q ← {Pd}; b R ← {Rd}
if | b Q| = t + 1 and Q = ∅ then
if Pi = L then
send the message (L,τ,send, b Q, b R) to each Pj
else
delay ← delay(t); start timer(delay)
upon a message (L,τ,send,Q,R/M) from L (ﬁrst time):
if verify-signature(Q,R/M) then
if Q = ∅ or Q = Q then
send the message (L,τ,echo,Q)sign to each Pj
upon a message (L,τ,echo,Q)sign from Pm (ﬁrst time):
eQ ← eQ + 1
if eQ = ⌈
n+t+1
2 ⌉ and rQ < t + 1 then
Q ← Q; M ← ⌈
n+t+1
2 ⌉ signed echo messages for Q
send the message (L,τ,ready,Q)sign to each Pj
upon a message (L,τ,ready,Q)sign from Pm(ﬁrst time):
rQ ← rQ + 1
if rQ = t + 1 and eQ < ⌈
n+t+1
2 ⌉ then
Q ← Q; M ← t + 1 signed ready messages for Q
send the message (L,τ,ready,Q)sign to each Pj
else if rQ = n − t − f then
stop timer, if any
wait for shared output-messages for each Pd ∈ Q
si ←
P
Pd∈Q si,d; ∀p,q : Cp,q ←
Q
Pd∈Q(Cd)p,q
output (L,τ,DKG-completed,C,si)
upon timeout
if lcflag = false then
if Q = ∅ then
send the msg (τ,lead-ch,π(L), b Q, b R)sign to each Pj
else
send the msg (τ,lead-ch,π(L),Q,M)sign to each Pj
lcflag ← true
upon (L,τ,in,recover):
send the message (L,τ,help) to all the nodes.
send all messages in BL,τ
upon a message (L,τ,help) from Pℓ:
if cℓ ≤ d(κ) and c ≤ (t + 1)d(κ) then
cℓ ← cℓ + 1; c ← c + 1
send all messages of Bℓ(L,τ)
Figure 2. DKG Protocol (Optimistic Phase)
Leader-change for node Pi in session (τ) with Leader L
upon a msg (τ,lead-ch,L,Q,R/M)sign from Pj(ﬁrst time):
if L > L and verify-signature(Q,R/M) then
lcL ← lcL + 1; L++ ← min(L++,L)
if R/M = R then b Q ← Q; b R ← R
else Q ← Q; M ← M
if (
P
lcL = t + 1 and lcflag = false) then
if Q = ∅ then
send the msg (τ,lead-ch,L++, b Q, b R) to each Pj
else
send the msg (τ,lead-ch,L++,Q,M) to each Pj
else if (lcL = n − t − f) then
M ← b R ← n − t − f signed lead-ch messages for L
L ← L; lcL ← 0; L++ ← π
−1(L); lcflag = false
if Pi = L then
if Q = ∅ then
send the message (L,τ,send, b Q, b R) to each Pj
else
send the message (L,τ,send,Q,M) to each Pj
else
delay ← delay(t); start timer(delay)
Figure 3. DKG Protocol (Pessimistic Phase)
a leader. The leader L, once it ﬁnishes the VSS proposal
by t + 1 nodes with (Pd,τ,out,shared,Cd,si,d), broad-
casts the n − t − f ready messages (set b R) it received
for each of those t + 1 ﬁnished VSSs (set b Q). Nodes
include signatures with ready messages to enable the leader
to provide a validity proof for its proposal. In this ex-
tended HybridVSS protocol, shared messages look like
(Pd,τ,out,shared,Cd,si,d,Rd), where a set Rd includes
n−t−f signed ready messages for session (Pd,τ). Once
this broadcast completes, each node knows t + 1 VSS
instances to wait for. Once a node Pi ﬁnishes those, it sums
the shares si,d to obtain its ﬁnal share si.
If the leader is faulty and does not proceed with the
protocol or sends arbitrary messages, the protocol enters into
a pessimistic phase. Here, other nodes use a leader-change
mechanism to change their leader with a pre-deﬁned cyclic
permutation (π) and provide liveness without damaging
system safety. Every unsatisﬁed node sends a signed leader-
change (lead-ch) request to all the nodes for the next leader
π(L) if it receives an invalid message from the existing
leader L or if its timer timed out. Timeouts are based on the
function delay(t) described in § 2.1. When a node collects
t+1 lead-ch messages for leaders > L, it is conﬁrmed that
at least one honest node is unsatisﬁed and it sends a lead-ch
message to all the nodes for the smallest leader among those
requested, if it has not done that yet. Once a node receives
n−t−f lead-ch requests for a leader L > L, it accepts L
as the new leader and enters into the optimistic phase. The
new leader also enters into the optimistic phase and sends
a send message for set Q if it is non-empty or else for
set b Q. Set M contains ⌈n+t+1
2 ⌉ signed echo messages ort + 1 signed ready messages for the associated set Q of
completed VSSs. Set Q avoids two honest nodes ﬁnishing
with two different VSSs sets, and set M avoids false Q sets
from the dishonest nodes. While sending its proposal, L also
includes lead-ch signatures received from n−t−f nodes to
prove its validity to the nodes who have not received enough
lead-ch messages. As in HybridVSS, the set B contains
all outgoing messages at a node along with their intended
recipients and Bℓ represents the subset of messages destined
for node Pℓ. Counters c and cℓ keep track of the numbers
of overall help requests and help requests sent by each node
Pℓ respectively. Figure 2 and Figure 3 present the optimistic
and the pessimistic phases of the DKG protocol respectively.
Protocol Rec remains exactly the same.
Analysis. The main theorem for our DKG is as follows.
Theorem 4.1: Assuming the hardness of the discrete-
logarithm problem, protocol DKG provides an asynchronous
distributed key generation mechanism in the hybrid model
for n ≥ 3t + 2f + 1.
We need to show liveness, agreement, consistency, privacy,
and efﬁciency of DKG. Here, we describe the most impor-
tant liveness and efﬁciency properties and refer readers to
[25] for the detailed analysis.
Liveness: In HybridVSS, if the dealer is honest and ﬁnally
up, then all honest ﬁnally up nodes complete the sharing
initiated by it. With n−t−f honest ﬁnally up nodes in the
system, each honest ﬁnally up node will eventually complete
sharings proposed by at least t + 1 nodes, as required. If
the leader is honest and uncrashed, and completes t + 1
HybridVSSs, before a timer—started after completing t+1
HybridVSSs—expires at an honest node (optimistic phase),
then it broadcasts its proposal and based on the liveness
property of the reliable broadcast [24], each honest ﬁnally
up node delivers the same veriﬁable proposal. To ﬁnish,
according to the HybridVSS agreement properties, all honest
ﬁnally up nodes complete protocol Sh for nodes in this
proposal.
If the leader is compromised, crashed or does not ﬁnish
t + 1 Sh protocols before a timeout at an honest node,
then a signed lead-ch request is broadcasted by that honest
node (pessimistic phase). After receiving n − t − f lead-
ch requests, the new leader takes over and the protocol
reenters the optimistic phase. As the number of crashes
is polynomially bounded and the network eventually gets
repaired resulting in message delays becoming eventually
bounded by delay(t), an honest ﬁnally up leader will even-
tually reliably broadcast a proposal and protocol DKG will
complete. The requirement of n−t−f lead-ch requests for
a leader replacement makes sure that nodes do not complete
the leader-change too soon. An honest node sends a signed
lead-ch message for the smallest leader (among the received
set) if it receives t+1 lead-ch messages, even if it has not
observed any fault, as this indicates that at least one honest
node has observed some fault and the node does not want
to start the leader-change too late.
Efﬁciency: The message and communication complexi-
ties of the n HybridVSS Sh protocols in DKG are O(tdn3)
and O(κtdn4) respectively. If the DKG protocol completes
without entering into the pessimistic phase, then the system
only needs an additional reliable broadcast of message of
size O(κn), message complexity O(tdn2) and communica-
tion complexity O(κtdn3). As a result, the optimal message
and communication complexities for the DKG protocol are
O(tdn3) and O(κtdn4) respectively. In the pessimistic case,
the total number of leader changes is bounded by O(d). Each
leader change involves O(tdn2) messages and O(κtdn3)
communication bits. For each faulty leader, O(tdn2) mes-
sages and O(κtdn3) bits are communicated during its ad-
ministration. Therefore, in the worst case, O(td2n2) mes-
sages and O(κtd2n3) bits are communicated before the
DKG completes and worst case message and communication
complexities of the DKG protocol are O(tdn2(n + d)) and
O(κtdn3(n + d)) respectively. Note that considering just
a t-limited Byzantine adversary (and not also crashes and
link failures), the above complexities become O(n3) and
O(κn4) respectively. These are same as the complexities of
the proactive refresh protocol for AVSS [17].
5. Realizing Proactiveness
In proactive security, nodes modify their shares at phase
changes such that an adversary’s knowledge of t shares from
one phase becomes useless in the next phase. Here, although
the adversary is restricted to t nodes during any phase, it may
corrupt more than t nodes in its complete lifetime without
learning anything about the secret. In this section, to realize
proactiveness in our DKG system, we introduce the notion
of phase in our hybrid model (§2) and design share renewal
and recovery protocols.
5.1. System Model
Common Phase. In the asynchronous communication
model, without a common clock, realizing the concept of a
common phase is difﬁcult. Similar to Cachin et al. [17], we
use local clocks with clock ticks at pre-deﬁned intervals. The
number of clock ticks received by a honest node deﬁnes its
local phase. In order to achieve the required synchronization
without hampering safety, nodes start the proactive protocol
with their local clock tick, but wait for t other nodes to start
the phase before proceeding with it.
Due to the eventual nature of the liveness condition, any
timing constraint always affects liveness of an asynchronous
protocol. A share renewal protocol in our model might not
terminate within the same phase. It is possible to achieve
liveness at the cost of safety/privacy by continuing with
the shares from the previous phase until new shares aredetermined. However, we give importance to safety rather
than liveness and system nodes delete their shares as the
renewal protocol starts; there is no phase overlap.
Byzantine Adversary. The adversary can corrupt at most t
nodes in any local phase τ ≥ 0. We assume that it is possible
to remove the adversary from a node by rebooting it in a
trusted way using a read-only device. As the adversary could
have extracted the private key from a recovering node, once
rebooted the node should ask the CA to put its old certiﬁcate
on its certiﬁcate revocation list, generate a new key pair and
get the new public key signed.
To maintain liveness in a proactive system with simultane-
ous Byzantine and crash-recovery nodes, we assume that the
crash-recovery time is more than the message transfer delay
between two uncrashed nodes; speciﬁcally, the time the
adversary takes to shift from one crashed node to another is
larger than required by a send message between two honest
uncrashed nodes. Note that this assumption is required ex-
clusively due to crash-recovery and link failure assumption.
We justify it in §5.2. The adversary may continue to hold a
node in consecutive phases.
It is also possible to use an asynchronous proactive secure
message transmission mechanism [28] to avoid frequent
public-private key pair modiﬁcations. However, this requires
a hardware secure co-processor.
Forward Secrecy. If a private communication channel be-
tween two honest nodes is not forward secret, the adversary
may decipher their secret communication by compromising
one of them in a later phase. To overcome this problem, we
use an ephemeral Difﬁe-Hellman cipher suite while creating
TLS links and reconstruct them at the start of each new
phase. This makes sure that a message sent in a local phase
τ of the sender is delivered to the receiver in the same local
phase or it is lost.
5.2. Share Renewal Protocol
A share renewal protocol enables DKG nodes to renew
their shares such that protocol Rec will output the same
secret and the adversary does not learn anything about
it. From a share renewal protocol, we expect liveness,
consistency, privacy and efﬁciency similar to the DKG
protocol, under the assumption that the adversary delivers
all associated messages within phase τ. We refer readers
to [25] for a detailed deﬁnition. We design a share renewal
protocol by making three modiﬁcations to our DKG, which
are motivated by the refresh protocol in [17].
• On receiving a clock tick for phase τ, instead of running
the HybridVSS protocol for a random key, node Pi
reshares its share si,τ−1 from phase τ − 1. It then
erases the old share, the bivariate polynomial used
during resharing, and the univariate polynomials from
the send messages, and broadcasts its clock tick. While
retransmitting send messages during a node recovery,
only the commitments are sent.
• A node waits for t + 1 identical clock ticks before
proceeding with protocol Sh instances.
• Once a node Pi receives n−t−f ready messages for a
decided set Q, instead of adding shares si,d for Pd ∈ Q,
it Lagrange-interpolates them for index 0 to obtain the
new share. Commitments are accordingly modiﬁed as
Vℓ =
Q
Pd∈Q((Cd,τ)ℓ0)λ
Q,0
d for ℓ ∈ [0,t].
We delete the univariate polynomials from the send mes-
sages stored to facilitate recovery, as their compromise can
lead to compromise of the node’s previous-phase share and
subsequently the system’s secret. With the assumption that
t+1 honest and uncrashed nodes receive the send messages
transmitted by an honest and uncrashed node before the
adversary can crash them, liveness is guaranteed. Note that
each honest node need only receive t + 1 shares of its
univariate polynomial among the ⌈(n + t + 1)/2⌉ echo
messages in order that the protocol Sh can continue. We
refer readers to [25] for a detailed analysis.
5.3. Share Recovery Protocol
The adversary may crash, isolate or compromise some of
the nodes. This may get detected by the node itself or by the
system as a whole using the techniques beyond our scope.
After detection of crash and compromise, a node will be
rebooted using read-only memory, which however does not
provide it with its share. In a proactive DKG system, the
ability of a node to recover its lost share, when rebooted as
above or alienated from the part of the network, must be
ensured. Otherwise, the adversary can destroy the complete
system by gradually crashing or isolating n − t nodes.
The recover and help message in our HybridVSS, DKG
and share renewal protocols sufﬁce to handle share recov-
eries. To achieve automatic share recovery upon reboot, we
add a recover message to nodes’ reboot procedure.
6. Group Modiﬁcation Protocols
On a long term basis, it is inevitable that the set of nodes
in the system will need to be modiﬁed; new nodes may join
or old nodes may leave. To maintain the resilience bound
n ≥ 3t + 2f + 1, this may also lead to a modiﬁcation in
the security threshold t or the crash-limit f of the system.
Here, we present protocols to achieve node addition, node
removal, security threshold and crash-limit modiﬁcation.
6.1. Group Modiﬁcation Agreement
For group modiﬁcation protocols, it is important to in-
clude a mechanism to propose and agree on group modi-
ﬁcation proposals. Leaving this to node administrators cannot only create bottlenecks in the system, but it can also
provide new avenues to attack it. Using reliable broadcast
methodology, we propose a simple agreement protocol for
this. To avoid inefﬁcient atomic or causal broadcast prim-
itives [29], we impart commutativity to the group modiﬁ-
cation proposals. Node addition and removal operations are
commutative in nature; however, the threshold and crash-
limit modiﬁcations are not. We solve this problem by attach-
ing threshold and crash-limit modiﬁcation requests to node
addition or removal proposals. With every node addition or
removal proposal, a proposer has to specify whether change
in the size of the group made by its proposal should affect
the security-threshold or the crash-limit. An interested node
will send such a proposal to all the nodes and nodes who
agree with the proposal continue with echo messages from
a reliable broadcast [24]. Once it receives n − t − f ready
messages, a node adds the proposal into its modiﬁcation
queue. Like other proactive protocols, assuming that the
n−t−f nodes ﬁnish with the same set of proposals during
a phase, liveness is assured; additionally, safety is always
assured.
6.2. Node Addition
We can increase the redundancy of the system by adding
new nodes. It is easily possible to provide shares to the
added nodes at the start of a new phase by including those
into the list of nodes. Although the new nodes cannot
contribute with send messages, for any node-additions with
new threshold smaller than the old honest-uncrashed count,
sufﬁcient renewal proposals are available.
However, considering possible large durations of phases
or even the absence of proactivity, we need a node-addition
protocol that does not rely on share renewal. We obtain one
by making three small modiﬁcations to our DKG.
• On receiving a Node-Add request, instead of running
protocol Sh of HybridVSS for a random key, node Pi
reshares its current share si,τ and broadcasts the Node-
Add request received. It then waits for t other identical
Node-Add requests before proceeding.
• Once a node Pi receives n − t − f ready mes-
sages for a decided set Q, it Lagrange-interpolates
si,d for Pd ∈ Q for index new and provides sub-
share si,new to node Pnew with commitments Vℓ = Q
Pd∈Q((Cd,τ)ℓ,new)λ
Q,new
d for ℓ ∈ [0,t].
• Node Pnew, upon obtaining t + 1 shares for same
commitment vector Vℓ for ℓ ∈ [0,t], interpolates them
for index 0 to obtain its share snew.
A subshare si,new provided by node Pi is actually a share of
a t-degree polynomial h(x) such that h(0) = snew. We refer
readers to [25] for a detailed analysis. Further, it is possible
to add multiple nodes simultaneously by running last two of
the above modiﬁcation separately for each node.
6.3. Node Removal
This protocol involves removing a node from the system
such that it should no longer be able to reconstruct the secret.
Without modifying the shares for the other nodes, it is not
possible to remove a node in the middle of a phase and we
are restricted to removing it at the start of a new phase. To
remove a node from the group involves simply not including
it in the next share renewal protocol. An honest node should
not carry out a node removal if that would invalidate the
resilience bound n ≥ 3t + 2f + 1.
6.4. Security Threshold and Crash-Limit Modiﬁca-
tion
Security threshold and crash-limit modiﬁcation involves
changing the threshold limit t or the crash-limit f of the
system. For the same reason as node removal, it is not
possible to modify the threshold and crash limits in the
middle of a phase. With their lack of commutativity, we
avoid direct threshold t and crash-limit f modiﬁcations. We
modify t and f at the phase-change based on the all the node
addition and removal requests conﬁrmed during the previous
phase. Nodes update their t and f values accordingly and
start their HybridVSS instances with the updated parameter
values. As a feature of the renewal protocol, the threshold
value can be easily changed by just correctly changing the
degrees of the resharing polynomials.
7. System Architecture
System Design. In our deterministic state machine design,
nodes moves from one state to another based on messages
received. Messages are categorized into three types: operator
messages, network messages and timer messages. Operator
messages, which are of types in and out, deﬁne interac-
tions between nodes and their operators. Network messages
realize protocol ﬂows between nodes. As we use a weak
synchrony assumption to maintain liveness, we also include
timer messages in the form of start timer and stop timer,
which work according to the delay(t) function described in
§ 2.1.
Defence against DoS and Sybil Attacks. The distributed
nature of DKG provides an inherent protection against DoS
attacks and the inclusion of crashed nodes and network fail-
ure assumptions makes DoS attacks less feasible. Although
leaders might become primary targets, we mitigate this issue
with an efﬁcient leader-changing mechanism. Further, as all
valid communication is done over TLS links, nodes can
easily reject messages arriving from non-system entities.
Sybil attacks are not a major concern, as ad-hoc additions of
nodes is not a feature of our system. Nodes are added using
the group modiﬁcation agreement protocol, which involves
administrative interaction at each node.8. Concluding Remarks
We have designed the ﬁrst DKG protocol for use over
the Internet. We proposed a hybrid system model and
demonstrated its applicability with a rigorous analysis. We
established the requirement of Byzantine agreement for
asynchronous DKG and presented a DKG protocol in our
hybrid model. Realizing the importance of proactive security
and group modiﬁcations, we deﬁned protocols for them.
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